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Created by SB 37 (Maddy) (Chapter 12, Statutes of 1993), the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) is an audit­ing and investigative agency which operates under 
the administrative oversight of the Milton Marks Commis­
sion on California State Government Organization and 
Economy (also known as the "Little Hoover Commission"). 
In Government Code section 8543 et seq., SB 37 delegates 
to BSA most of the duties previously performed by the Audi­
tor General's Office, such as examining and reporting annu­
ally upon the financial statements prepared by the executive 
branch of the state, performing other related assignments 
(such as performance audits) that are mandated by statute, 
and administering the Reporting of Improper Governmental 
Activities Act, Government Code section 8547 et seq. BSA 
is also required to conduct audits of state and local govern­
ment requested by the Joint Legislative Audit Committee 
(JLAC) to the extent that funding is available. BSA is headed 
by the State Auditor, appointed by the Governor to a four­
year term from a list of three qualified individuals submitted 
by the JLAC. 
Major Projects 
The Cost of the PU Cs Regulation of 
Trans,portation Companies 
In California Public Utilities Commission: It Does Not 
Know Its True Costs of Regulating Transportation Compa­
nies (No. 98021; December 1998), BSA examined the fees 
collected by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) from 
privately-owned freight railroad and passenger transporta­
tion companies (transportation companies), and found they 
may not sufficiently cover the costs of regulating these com­
panies. As a result, the PUC's other fee-payers, such as truck­
ing and utility companies, may subsidize freight railroad and 
passenger transportation regulation. Because its former ac­
counting system did not isolate expendi tures for the 
Commission's various funds, the PUC does not know the true 
cost of transportation regulation during fiscal year 1997-98. 
Consequently, its other fee-payers may have subsidized up 
to $919,000 for these costs. 
In addition, fees received from railroad corporations did 
not cover all of the Commission's corresponding expenses 
because the Public Utilities Code limits the amount and types 
of costs for which the Commission can use such moneys. 
Nonetheless, the PUC spent approximately $2.9 million on 
allowed railroad costs-$119,000 less than the $3 million 
cap established by the Code. Finally, the PUC installed a new 
accounting system in July 1998 that allows it to separate costs 
by fund. However, in determining which costs it should allo­
cate to its various funds, the PUC excluded $5. 1 million in 
overhead expenses for facilities. Unless it properly allocates 
all relevant costs on the new accounting 
system, the Commission will continue to 
be unable to determine the true costs of providing services to 
transportation companies and other fee-payers. 
BSA recommended that the PUC, to ensure that its other 
fee-payers are not subsidizing railroad safety regulation, press 
for legislation allowing it to use railroad corporation fees to 
pay a fair share of its overhead costs. To determine its true 
costs of regulating utility and transportation companies, BSA 
suggested that the Commission equitably allocate all relevant 
overhead costs, including rent for its headquarters building, 
to its various funds. 
Auditor Criticizes OSHPD,s Cal-Mortgage 
Loan Insurance Program 
In Office of Statewide Health Planning and Develop­
ment: The Cal-Mortgage Program Does Not Minimize the 
State's Financial Risk When Insuring Health Facility Debt 
(No. 97108; October 1998), BSA evaluated the Cal-Mortgage 
Loan Insurance Program (Cal-Mortgage) administered by the 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development 
(OSHPD). Cal-Mortgage insures loans for health facility con­
struction in California, including hospitals, primary care clin­
ics, and elderly care facilities. Many of Cal-Mortgage's cli­
ents are high-risk borrowers that could not obtain loans with­
out this insurance because their projects are deemed too risky. 
Accordingly, the likelihood of default for Cal-Mortgage cli­
ents is significantly higher than it is for clients of larger, pri­
vate insurers. When its borrowers default and are unable to 
continue payment on their debt, Cal-Mortgage must pay off 
the insured debt. Although the very nature of dealing with 
high-risk borrowers increases the likelihood of defaults, BSA 
found that Cal-Mortgage further increases its risk of client 
defaults with its ineffectual application process, vague guide­
lines, and incomplete and inconsistent monitoring. 
BSA's audit revealed that Cal-Mortgage does not ad­
equately screen applicants because it does not adhere to ob­
jective guidelines in its application process. It does not use 
all available information or standard procedures to assess its 
applicants' financial viability, nor has it established proce­
dures for determining its maximum level of risk when insur­
ing a client. Due to this inadequate process, Cal-Mortgage 
has insured a number of financially unstable applicants, some 
of which have defaulted on their loans. Cal-Mortgage does 
not consistently require that borrowers submit information 
about their financial condition, and it does not consistently 
conduct timely or structured site visits with borrowers. As a 
result, Cal-Mortgage may have little notice of financial diffi­
culties before a borrower defaults on its debt. Weaknesses in 
its monitoring include inconsistent methods to oversee bor­
rowers, a lack of formal procedures for this oversight, and 
insufficient supervision by Cal-Mortgage management. 
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Moreover, Cal-Mortgage cannot effectively monitor the 
risk in its borrower portfolio because the portfolio database 
is unreliable, contains numerous errors, and is not properly 
maintained. Finally, because Cal-Mortgage does not have 
benchmarks or standard criteria for identifying problem bor­
rowers that require executive management intervention, the 
director of the OSHPD, which oversees this insurance pro­
gram, may not be fully aware of the risk present in Cal­
Mortgage's portfolio. 
To improve consistency and minimize the risk of finan­
cial loss to the state, BSA recommended that Cal-Mortgage 
develop a more rigorous process to determine the financial 
viability of applicants, and define a maximum level of risk 
that it will accept when insuring a borrower. BSA also sug­
gested that the legislature consider changing the law to re­
quire that Cal-Mortgage develop a maximum level of insur­
ance risk acceptable for loan insurance approval. The new 
law should ensure that Cal-Mortgage sets the risk level to 
minimize the potential of loan defaults and the resulting de­
fault payments from the Health Facilities Construction Loan 
Insurance Fund, while still being able to accomplish its statu­
tory mission. To ensure that Cal-Mortgage adequately over­
sees its borrowers and is sufficiently warned of those experi­
encing financial difficulties, BSA recommended that it es­
tablish a standard monitoring system for tracking and ana­
lyzing borrowers' financial information. To improve its man­
agement information for monitoring and oversight, Cal-Mort­
gage should periodically review the portfolio database for 
errors and develop procedures for maintaining and ensuring 
the integrity of the database. Finally, Cal-Mortgage should 
develop benchmarks and standard criteria for calling an at­
risk borrower's financial status to OSHPD's attention, to en­
sure that OSHPD management has the information necessary 
to assess the level of risk in the portfolio. 
State Agency Readiness for The Year 2000 
In Year 2000 Computer Problem: Progress May Be Overly 
Optimistic and Certain Implications Have Not Been Ad­
dressed (No. 98023; August 1998), BSA examined the progress 
of state agencies in fixing their computer systems to recognize 
the year 2000. Thousands of critical state computer systems 
must be adapted in order to allow the continued delivery of 
essential products and services to Californians. To address this 
important issue, Governor Wilson designated the Department 
of Information Technology (DOIT) to oversee, coordinate, and 
report on efforts agencies are making to ensure that over 2,700 
of the state's computer systems are fixed to recognize the year 
2000. These efforts involve repairing and testing or replacing 
components to recognize both the 20th and 21st centuries. The 
DOIT requires agencies, departments, boards, and commissions 
under its purview to report the status of their information tech­
nology systems and associated remediation efforts on a monthly 
basis; at the end of each quarter, DOIT in tum reports to the 
administration and the legislature. 
BSA surveyed 39 state agencies which report to DOIT 
and have critical computer systems, and concluded that al­
most 700 of the state's critical computer projects may not be 
as far along as reported by DOIT in its April 1998 quarterly 
report to the administration and legislature. Furthermore, 
many state agencies have not addressed all facets of the year 
2000 problem and, therefore, may not actually be ready for 
the next millennium. 
Specifically, agencies are prematurely declaring their 
critical projects complete that have not been thoroughly tested. 
Critical projects are those so important that their failure would 
cause a significant negative impact on the health and safety 
of Californians, on the fiscal or legal integrity of state opera­
tions, or on the continuation of essential state agency pro­
grams. Thus far, none of the agencies reporting on completed 
critical projects to the DOIT have rigorously tested their in­
formation-technology systems, comprised of one or more criti­
cal projects, in an isolated environment where the computer's 
internal clock is set to dates in the next century to make sure 
the systems will continue to function after the year 2000. 
Moreover, several agencies responsible for remediating large, 
complex systems have yet to even schedule such tests at ei­
ther of the state's two data centers. While all critical projects 
may not need this type of testing, the fact that none of the ten 
agencies reporting completed critical projects to the DOIT 
has used such testing on those projects caused BSA concern. 
Moreover, in many cases the amount of time agencies are 
allocating to test their critical projects falls far short of the 
50%-70% of total project time and resources that others in 
the industry have spent on testing. 
In addition, many of the state's critical computer projects 
and systems depend on data exchanges with other entities, 
such as counties and the federal government. Yet not all agen­
cies have completed the necessary steps to ensure that data 
transmitted through these interfaces will work seamlessly with 
the state's computer systems into the next century. Even if 
agencies successfully fix their own critical computer systems, 
they still may not be able to deliver expected products and 
services in the next millennium if their data-exchange part­
ners' systems are not year 2000-ready. 
Finally, the managers of most state agencies have yet to 
ensure that their agencies have established appropriate busi­
ness continuation plans in the event of failures or delays 
caused by the year 2000 problem. Agencies appear to be fo­
cusing exclusively on fixing critical computer systems and 
choosing not to involve the individuals responsible for pro­
gram deiivery in determining what to do if critical systems 
do not work as intended or are delayed. However, rather than 
using staff involved with remediation, BSA believes the man­
agers responsible for the agencies' core business processes 
should establish work groups of program staff and dedicate 
sufficient resources to develop business continuation plans 
to ensure that the agencies maintain the delivery of essential 
products and services in the event of year 2000-induced fail­
ures or delays. 
To ensure uninterrupted delivery of essential products 
and services to Californians, BSA recommended that the 
Governor's Office ensure that all state agencies take the fol- · 
lowing steps: (1) provide DOIT with accurate information 
about the status of their year 2000 remediation efforts-spe-
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cifically, the estimated completion dates for each phase of remediation, including final completion, should reflect the agency's best estimate for the actual completion dates and should be updated whenever circumstances affecting a project's status change; (2) thoroughly and comprehensively test the remediation for each critical project; for larger, com­plex projects associated with systems that support the deliv­ery of services to Californians where interruption would be unacceptable, agencies should also consider testing the sys­tem in an isolated computer environment using a time ma­chine; moreover, prior to declaring a project complete, tests of any internal interdependencies, external data exchanges, 20th and 21st century date recognition, and the impacts from embedded systems such as desktop computers, should be com­plete and the project acceptance tested and approved by agency managers responsible for the business functions; (3) protect their computer systems from missing or corrupted data supplied by external parties-specifically, agencies should identify their data-exchange partners, develop schedules for testing and implementing new date formats, and thoroughly test data supplied by external parties; and (4) establish busi­ness continuation planning groups, made up of managers from major business units, experts in relevant functional areas, business continuation and disaster recovery specialists, op­erational analysts, and contract specialists; these planning groups should then follow a structured approach to develop a business continuation plan for each core business process and infrastructure component affected by the year 2000 problem. In addition, to ensure that the administration and the leg­islature have accurate information about state agencies' progress toward fixing their critical projects and systems threatened .by year 2000 problems, BSA recommended that DOIT continue to collect and analyze information state agen­cies provide on their overall progress. If, after analyzing the reported information, something appears anomalous-such as too little test time-DOIT should contact the agency for an explanation. DOIT should also continue to collect infor­mation from agencies on their data-exchange partners. In addition, it should take appropriate follow-up action if it ap­pears that agencies are not testing their interfaces with data­exchange partners. DOIT should require agencies, as part of their monthly reporting, to indicate whether they have busi­ness continuation plans that ensure that each core business function will continue uninterrupted if the critical computer systems supporting those functions fail to work or are de­layed because of year 2000 problems. 
The High Cost of Incarcerating Inmates In California Department of Co"ections: The Cost of 
Incarcerating Inmates in State-Run Prisons ls Higher Than 
the Department's Published Cost (No. 97125; September 1998), BSA analyzed the Department of Corrections' calcu­lation of its costs of incarcerating 146,000 criminals. Each fiscal year, the Department calculates and publishes the amount of incarceration costs per inmate. The Department's calculation focuses primarily on those operating costs directly related to housing and supporting inmates, such as food, cloth-
ing, health care, and inmate activities. For fiscal year 1996-97, the Department calculated annual incarceration costs at $21,012 per inmate. BSA reviewed the Department's calcu­lation and found that, although it appropriately reflects many of the operating costs, it does not include all costs incurred by the state. When BSA included all of the costs, it found that annual incarceration costs were $24,807 per inmate for fiscal year 1996-97, $3,795 higher per inmate than the Department's published figure. The total difference of costs to incarcerate inmates between the Department's calculation and BSA's es­timate is $517 million. The primary reason for this difference is the Department's calculation does not include capital costs, such as lease-purchase payments, debt service costs for new construction, and costs of improving and renovating existing prisons. The Department's calculation also does not include reimbursements to local governments for transportation costs, court fees, and county charges related to state inmates. Fi­nally, the Department's calculation does not include its share of state central-service costs, such as costs of various account­ing functions performed by the State Controller's Office for other state departments. BSA calculated the annual incarceration costs per inmate for each of the 32 state-run prisons operating during fiscal year 1996-97, as well as the statewide cost per inmate. BSA's calculation includes all operating and capital costs. BSA found that annual incarceration costs per inmate vary significantly from one prison to another, depending on each prison's secu­rity levels, facility types, and age. Annual costs per inmate for the 32 prisons ranged from $ 18,562 to $38,554 per year. BSA recommended that, to accurately determine the rel­evant cost of prison operations, the Department should in­clude all operating and capital costs in its calculation of how much the state pays annually to incarcerate criminals. 
Millions Spent on Incomplete Los Angeles 
Courthouse Projects In Los Angeles County: Millions Spent on Courthouse 
Projects That May Never Be Built (No. 97119; July 1998), BSA found that since 1988, Los Angeles County has spent $79 million on eight incomplete courthouse construction projects financed through its Robbins Courthouse Construction Fund. Five of these courthouse projects have scant chance of being built, yet the County spent $ 18.6 million on them-$9.9 mil­lion for planning and design, money from which it will derive no benefit, and $8. 7 million for land that now sits idle. Following approval of its master courthouse construc­tion program in 1988, the County started eight courthouse projects. However, it predicated its ambitious program on revenue projections that, because of subsequent changes in law, proved to be overly optimistic and cost projections that were too low. In addition, the County failed to perform com­parative needs assessments and did not prioritize the court­house projects to determine where construction funds could be most effectively spent. To compound these problems, the courthouse projects have been plagued by significant delays. Some of the delays, such as those caused by the Northridge earthquake and relocation of one courthouse, were out of the 
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control of the County. Other delays have resulted from the 
County's poor control over the projects. Three years into the 
program, an outside consultant warned the County that it could 
not finance the entire courthouse construction program, but 
the County continued to purchase land and develop plans for 
all eight projects. The County was finally forced to defer six 
projects in 1994 due to insufficient funding. Had the County 
reacted promptly to the consultant's warning, it could have 
prevented spending as much as $7 .8 million of the $9 .9 mil­
lion it spent on planning and designing projects it eventually 
deferred, and $8.6 million on unnecessary land purchases. 
Until revenues increased recently, the County lacked suf­
ficient funding to complete any of the projects it deferred. 
However, the County now 
projects that if the current revenue 
BTH's primary interest is in business and transportation regu­
lation, rather than the delivery of health care. According to 
BSA, "given the current health plan environment and because 
health care holds a minority interest within the overall opera­
tions of the agency, it seems unlikely that the state would 
again decide today to have this agency regulate health plans." 
At the request of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, 
BSA evaluated the "fit" of other ·state agencies to take over 
the regulation of managed care. During its review, BSA ana­
lyzed the skills, expertise, and focus of the Department of 
Consumer Affairs, the Department of Health Services, and 
the Department of Insurance; BSA did not attempt to ascer­
tain the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at these 
departments nor at DOC. BSA 
levels continue, it will have suffi­
cient funding to complete one of 
the deferred projects-the Ante­
lope Valley courthouse. BSA rec­
ommended that the county pro-
BSA concluded that the regulation. of 
health plans belongs within the Health and 
Welfare Agency. 
found that all three departments 
perform, to varying degrees, the 
types of functions necessary to 
regulate health plans; however, 
BSA concluded that-of the 
ceed with caution. These revenues are subject to sudden 
changes, and even small decreases in revenues or increases 
in costs could jeopardize the County's ability to fund the 
project. Unfortunately, the County has not identified the fac­
tors that account for the recent increase in revenue. Thus, it 
has no assurance its projections are based on realistic assump­
tions. As a result, BSA believes the County risks repeating its 
past mistakes by spending money on projects it cannot com­
plete. 
Nonetheless, the County has taken steps to improve its 
project development process. In 1995, the County reorganized 
some duties and in 1997 it adopted a capital projects manage­
ment process. Although these actions appear to address its main 
problems, the changes are too recent to evaluate in practice. 
To ensure that the County maximizes scarce resources 
for courthouse construction, BSA recommended that the 
County conduct a countywide comparative needs assessment 
and continue projects based on the greatest need. To ensure 
project funding is realistic, the County should monitor fac­
tors that will affect revenues or costs, revise cash flow pro­
jections, and recommend changes to the courthouse construc­
tion program whenever warranted. 
The Proper Agency to Regulate Managed Care 
In Department of Corporations: To Optimize Health 
Plan Regulation, This Function Should Be Moved to the 
Health and Welfare Agency (No. 971 18. 1 ;  May 1998), BSA 
examined the regulation of managed care by the Department 
of Corporations (DOC) within the Business, Transportation 
and Housing Agency. BSA noted that DOC regulates three 
unique types of businesses: health care service plans, securi­
ties and franchise investments, and financial lenders. As to 
health plans, DOC administers the Knox-Keene Health Care 
Service Plan Act of 1975. While health plan enrollment has 
increased significantly in the past 20 years, BTH devotes only 
1 % of its 39,000 employees, and only 5% of its $8 billion 
budget, to DOC's Health Plan Division (Division). Further, 
three-the Department of Health 
Services within the Health and Welfare Agency offers the most 
suitable environment for the Division. 
Additionally, BSA noted that the state also has the op­
tion of creating an entirely new entity that would perform the 
required regulatory functions. Regardless of whether the state 
moves the Division to an existing department or creates a 
new entity, BSA concluded that the regulation of health plans 
belongs within the Health and Welfare Agency. In locating 
health plan oversight in this agency, the state can capitalize 
on the agency's expertise and its focus on health care mat­
ters. 
Other Reports 
BSA also issued the following reports between July 1 and 
December 3 1 ,  1998: Los Angeles Metropolitan Transporta­
tion Authority: Creating a Separate San Fernando Valley 
Authority Would Take a Split of Assets, Revenue, and Debt 
(No. 98107; July 1998); South Coast Air Quality Manage­
ment District: The District Should Establish a More Equi­
table Emission Fee Structure and Process Permits More 
Promptly (No. 971 14; July 1998); Department of Health Ser­
vices: Drug Treatment Authorization Requests Continue to 
Increase (No. 98012; August 1998); Cajon Valley Union 
School District: The District Needs to Improve Its Manage­
rial Oversight and Accountability (No. 97124; August 1998); 
Marks-Roos Bond Act Bo"owings: Several Cities Misused 
the Program and Some Financed Risky Projects Which May 
Result in Investor Losses (No. 97127; September 1998); Prison 
Industry Authority: Its Outside Purchase of Goods and Ser­
vices is Neither Well Planned nor Cost Effective (No. 98102; 
September 1998); State Contracting: The State Can Do More 
to Save Money When Acquiring Goods and Services (No. 
97015; October 1998); Los Angeles County Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority: Its Plan for Managing Debt is 
Reasonable (No. 981 19; October 1998); Lahontan Regional 
Water Quality Control Board: Has Not Accomplished All of 
Its Regulatory Work and Has Not Always Vigorously Acted 
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Against Water Quality Violations (No. 97123 ; November 1998); State of California: Statement of Securities Account­ability of the State Treasurer's Office (June 30, 1998) (No. 98008; November 1998); Automated Child Support System: 
Selection of Interim System Appears Reasonable (No. 98025; November 1998); Department of Transportation: Seismic 
Retrofit ExpendiJures Comply with the Bond Act (No. 98022; December 1998); Forensic Laboratories: Many Face 
Challenges BeyondAccreditation to Assure the Highest Qual­ity Services (No. 97025;  December 1998); California Drink­
ing Water: State and Local Agencies Need to Provide Lead­
ership to Address Contamination of Groundwater by Gaso­
line Components andAddiJives (No. 98112; December 1998); 
Los Angeles Community College District: Proposed Reforms 
Have Not Fully Addressed Past Problems and Create a New 
Set of Challenges (No. 97107; December 1998); and State 
of California: Financial Report Year Ended June 30, 1998 (No. 98001; December 1998). 
Legislation 
AB 2067 (Cuneen), as amended August 17, requires BSA to submit a report to the legislature by June 30, 1999 making recommendations for changes in the structure of the fees which generators of hazardous waste are required to pay to the State Board of Equalization. This bill was signed by the Governor on September 26 (Chapter 880, Statutes of 1998). 
Litigation 
In a case of first impression, Braun v. Bureau of State 
Audits, 67 Cal. App. 4th 1382 (Nov. 23, 1998), the First Dis­trict Court of Appeal held that statements made by BSA in an 
in official proceeding authorized by law). The trial court sus­tained BSA's demurrer; plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the First District held that plaintiff's tort claims were properly dismissed under Civil Code section 47(b), which immunizes from civil action "a privileged publication or broadcast," including one made in the course of a legisla­tive proceeding, a judicial proceeding, or "in any other offi­cial proceeding authorized by law." The Reporting Act ex­pressly authorizes the State Auditor to investigate allegations of improper governmental activity; under Government Code section 8547(a), if the Auditor determines that there is rea­sonable cause to believe that an employee or state agency has engaged in any improper governmental activity, "he or she shall report the nature and details of the activity to the head of the employing agency, or the appropriate authority. If ap­propriate, the State Auditor shall report this information to the Attorney General, the policy committees of the Senate and Assembly having jurisdiction over the subject matter, and to any other authority that the State Auditor determines ap­propriate." Under section 8547.7(b), the head of the employ­ing agency or appropriate appointing authority must then re­port monthly to the State Auditor until "final action has been taken" on the report. The court noted that its holding is consistent with nu­merous cases which have reached the same conclusion with respect to statements made in or about other types of govern­mental investigations, and other cases which have reasoned that "a communication to an official administrative agency, which communication is designed to prompt action by that agency, is as much a part of the 'official proceeding' as a communication made after the proceedings have com­menced." The court also stated that "one policy underlying investigative audit report are ab­solutely privileged under Civil Code 47(b), such that plaintiff's tort claims against the Bureau were properly dismissed by the trial court. 
�----------· _____ __ __ ---� the absolute privilege for state-
In early 1994, pursuant to al­legations submitted under the Re­porting of Improper Governmen-
.The First Distric� Court of Appeal;held that 
statements made by BSA in an investigative 
-audit report'lre absolutely privileged undef' 
Civil: Co,:fe 47(b), such that plainJ:ifrs. tort 
claims against the Bureau were' properly 
dismissed by the trial court. 
ments made in governmental in­vestigations and reports of mis­conduct 'is to assure utmost free­dom of communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to investi­gate and remedy wrongdoing. '  
tal Activities Act, Government Code section 8547 et seq., BSA began an investigative audit of the Center for Pre-hospital Research and Training (CPRn, an activity within the Uni­versity of California at San Francisco's (UCSF) School of Medicine which supported emergency medical services in the community. Plaintiff/appellant Odelia Braun was the medi­cal director of the CPRT. BSA's 73-page November 1994 report of its audit found that plaintiff, who was not identified by name in the report, and UCSF had "grossly mismanaged" the CPRT, and accused plaintiff of "numerous improprieties." [ 15: 1 CRLR 22-23 J As a result of the report and publicity which ensued, plaintiff lost her job and the CPRT was closed. Plaintiff sued BSA in tort for compensatory and punitive dam­ages; BSA demurred on grounds that its report was absolutely privileged under Civil Code section 47, subdivisions (a) (pub­lication in the discharge of official duty) and (b) (publication 
This consideration is especially pertinent here because the express purpose of the Reporting Act is to foster such communications." The court rejected appellant's argument that nothing in the Reporting Act authorizes BSA to make its audit reports public. "Although the statute does not expressly refer to the release of investigative audit reports and findings to the pub­lic, the State Auditor submits that this is the statute's intent." The court examined the language of section 854 7. 7 ( c) ("[e]very investigative audit shall be kept confidential, ex­cept that the State Auditor may issue any report of an investi­gation that has been substantiated, keeping confidential the identity of the individual or individuals involved, or release any findings resulting from an investigation conducted pur­suant to this article that is deemed necessary to serve the in­terests of the state"), and found support for the Auditor's in-terpretation. 
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